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Abstract
Based on administrative data from the federal employment office in Germany, we apply
matching techniques to estimate the stepping-stone function of temporary agency work for
the unemployed, i.e. its short-run and long-run effects on their future employment prospects.
Our results show that unemployed workers who take up a job in the temporary work agency
(TWA) industry are on average more likely than unemployed workers not joining TWA work
to be in agency employment in the four year period these workers are tracked after entering
TWA work. However, we find no discernable effects on the probabilities of being either in
regular employment or registered unemployment. Our findings therefore do not lend support
to the stepping-stone function of temporary agency work.
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1 Introduction
Temporary agency work has expanded rapidly across Europe over the last decade. While concerns
have been raised about this trend expansion, because of the perceived inferior quality of jobs
created on this submarket, growing attention is being paid to the potential longer-term effects of
temporary work agency (TWA) employment on the labor market prospects of workers. For labor
turnover in this industry is exceedingly high, and TWA employment spells generally constitute but
a short transitory period in the labor market histories of workers.
Because of its strong employment record and acclaimed stepping-stone function as a route
for the jobless to reenter regular employment, policy makers across Europe increasingly take an
active stance in further promoting TWA work. The latter motive proved particularly attractive in
Germany. With stubbornly high rates of unemployment putting a drain on public resources and
the efficiency of the federal employment service increasingly being questioned, policy makers in
Germany discovered TWA work as a cost-effective complementary means to get the unemployed
back into work. Deregulation of the TWA industry became a central pillar of the large-scale labor
market reform package passed in Germany in late 2002. Furthermore, this latest reform of the
Law on Placement Activity (LoPA) also sought to actively exploit the presumed stepping-stone
function of TWA work through the large-scale creation by public tender of subsidized temporary
work agencies, or personnel-service-agencies (PSA), in all of Germany’s 181 employment office
districts. These PSA operate as ordinary TWAs for the sole purpose of providing unemployed
workers ports of entry to the labor market and above all subsequent springboards to social-security
employment (’temp-to-perm’) by way of temporary work assignments with different firms.
Empirical evidence on the stepping-stone function of TWAwork, however, hardly exists (Storrie,
2002). By investigating the extent to which TWA work indeed facilitates transitions of previously
unemployed workers into regular jobs in Germany, this paper therefore also provides a test of
whether the latest reform of the LoPA in Germany has been enacted on false premises.
We confine the empirical analysis to an investigation of the stepping-stone function of TWA
employment for unemployed job-seekers only. This restriction in focus is inspired by the fact that
the most recent reform of the law on placement activity in Germany has been enacted largely for the
acclaimed bridging function of TWA work for this particular group of workers. With about every
second worker entering TWA work in Germany from unemployment, the population of interest
chosen does, however, represent a significant share of all inflows into TWA work. Conditioning the
analysis on prior unemployment experience has the additional advantage of providing some sort of
initial condition among the sample chosen, excluding, for instance, students and pupils who only
perform vacation work in a TWA, without seeking any steady employment. In the remainder of this
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paper, we will, as is commonly done, refer to social-security employment outside the TWA industry
as ’regular employment’. This is understood as but a terminological convention. For apart from
the irregular triangular setup of the TWA submarket, workers in the German TWA industry do in
fact enjoy the same employment protection and worker rights as other workers under the provisions
of general labor and social security law (Klös, 2000). Focusing on the first unemployment spell of
individuals who register as unemployed in 1994 to 1996, we are able to follow these workers for up
to a minimum of 5 years and thus are in a position to study both the short-term and long-term
effects of TWA employment experience on their subsequent employment trajectories, rather than
having to evaluate the effects of interest at a single, and often arbitrary point in time, as is often
the case in the evaluation literature because of data constraints. The matching approach employed
in this study is based on the methodology developed and applied by Barbara Sianesi in her studies
on the short- and long-term effects of worker participation in Swedish labor market programmes
(Sianesi, 2001/2004).
Our results show that unemployed workers who enter TWA employment within twelve months
of unemployment registration benefit from both higher monthly employment (TWA or regular)
and TWA employment probabilities throughout the four year period these workers are followed
post treatment than unemployed workers not joining TWA work. TWA workers, however, do
not enjoy greater chances of future regular employment, nor do they suffer from greater risks of
unemployment. While our results, therefore, do not lend empirical support to the stepping-stone
hypothesis of TWA work for unemployed job-seekers, they do neither confirm the existence of
adverse effects of agency work on the future regular employment and unemployment probabilities
of workers. If anything, TWA work seems to provide an access-to-work function for unemployed
workers that leaves them with a higher probability of employment for the entire four years their
subsequent labor market states are followed than comparable workers who do not join TWA work
as of yet in their unemployment spell.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys arguments for and against the existence
of a stepping-stone function of TWA work, Section 3 reviews the existing literature on the subject,
and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 addresses the evaluation problem encountered in
estimating the stepping-stone function of TWA work and proposes an appropriate framework for
empirical evaluation. Section 6 contains the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminary Considerations
A number of reasons have been cited in the literature, why TWA work may provide a bridge to
regular employment for the unemployed. First, TWA workers are frequently recruited among the
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un- or nonemployed and are thus given access to paid work or entry-level jobs (see, for example,
Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson, 1985), otherwise often denied to them on the general labor market.
Surveys among TWA workers show that one of the main reasons for taking up a job in the TWA
industry is the inability to find a regular job (see, for example, CIETT (2000) for Europe, Cohany
(1998) for the US, or IWG (1995) for Germany). Second, the unemployed may acquire skills and
gain work experience in TWA jobs that increase their productivity and thus improve their future
labor market prospects (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 1999; Paoli and Merrlié, 2001; Kvasnicka and
Werwatz, 2003), which puts to a halt the depreciation of human capital otherwise the case in
continued unemployment. Third, the search for regular employment may be more effective on a
TWA job than in unemployment, as work assignments provide opportunities for workers to get
to know different potential employers (Storrie, 2002), and to signal their ability (Ichino, Mealli,
and Nannicini, 2004). Fourth, employers may, in turn, utilize temporary agency work as a riskless
screening device to prospect and recruit workers for permanent positions (Segal and Sullivan,
1997a; Houseman, 1997; Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Autor, 2001). As client firms are in no way
contractually bound to TWA workers during a work assignment, on-the job screening is possible
without subjecting oneself to any firing restrictions or direct firing costs. Finally, TWA workers
are pre-screened by the agency, both in terms of general marketable skills when recruiting the
worker, and in terms of the specific requirements of client firms for a particular work assignment
(Autor, 2001; Burda and Kvasnicka, 2004). Increased screening may in turn also lead to better and
therefore more stable employment relationships, as match quality is improved by prior extensive
on-the-job screening (Katz and Krueger, 1999).
However, there have also been dissenting voices, pointing out that TWA workers often cycle be-
tween short employment spells in the industry and extended periods of unemployment (Bronstein,
1991), leading to potential labor market segmentation into low wage, less stable TWA jobs with
little opportunities for career advancement and highly paid permanent jobs (Mangum, Mayall, and
Nelson, 1985; Segal and Sullivan, 1997a). In particular, TWAs are likely to provide less formal
training on the job (Ferber and Waldfogel, 1998), as investment in general and therefore marketable
skills, by definition the only skills traded on this submarket, increase the risk of the worker being
poached before the agency can recoup its outlays through temporary work assignments. Finally,
TWA employment may also stigmatize workers in the eyes of potential employers under incomplete
information, as their inability to obtain regular work may be perceived by the latter as a signal of
low productivity.
4
3 Previous Research
Lack of longitudinal data on individual employment histories of temporary agency workers has
largely precluded empirical research on the stepping-stone function of TWA work. Existing studies
are mostly descriptive (see Storrie (2002) for a recent European survey; Rudolph and Schröder
(1997), or Brose, Schulze-Böing, and Meyer (1990) for Germany), and as such do not permit
any causal interpretation. Others fail to control for potential self-selection of workers into TWA
employment by restricting the analysis to posterior transitions of an initial stock sample of workers
already employed in the TWA industry (e.g. Finegold, Levenson, and van Buren (2003) and Segal
and Sullivan (1997b) for the US, García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2003), Malo and Muñoz-Bullón
(2002), and Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo, and Muñoz-Bullón (2004) for Spain, or Fridén, Hedén, and
Wadensjö (2000) and Andersson and Wadensjö (2004) for Sweden), or suffer from data defects,
in particular the ability to identify TWA workers across time (e.g. Segal and Sullivan (1997a) for
the US), that raise questions about the robustness of the results obtained. Case studies based on
data collected at a single TWA or specific geographic regions sometimes do find positive effects of
TWA work (e.g. Almus, Engeln, Lechner, Pfeiffer, and Spengler (1999) for non-profit TWAs in
Germany, or Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2004) for Italy), and sometimes don’t (e.g. Autor and
Houseman (2002) for the US), which makes it hard to draw any generalizable conclusions.
For lack of alternative data, different types of flexible employment forms, such as fixed-term
contract, casual, TWA or part-time employment, have also been frequently subsumed under the
ambiguous catch-all term ”temporary employment” to then estimate their impact on the future
labor market prospects of those holding these jobs (see, for example, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank
(2002) for the UK, or Zijl, Heyma, and van den Berg (2004) for the Netherlands). Differences in
the respective contractual arrangements, employment compositions, and economic roles performed
by these flexible work arrangements, however, make it all but clear, in how far results obtained in
this vein do in fact apply to each single heterogeneous employment form. As this literature review
illustrates, there is still a lack of solid evidence on whether or not temporary agency work provides
a gateway to regular employment. With this study, we want to contribute to this insufficiently
researched area.
4 The Data
The analysis is based on the IAB Employment Sample (IABES2) of the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB), a 2% random sample of all employees registered by the social security system
in Germany in the period 1975 to 2001. Data on East German workers is available from 1992
onwards. Employment information is based on statutory notifications of employers on their work-
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force to the institutions of the social security system. Containing a host of worker, firm, and
job-specific attributes and with information on unemployment periods involving benefit payments
added from the federal unemployment register, the IABES2 provides exact daily information on
the employment and unemployment trajectories of more than one million individuals in the 27
years sampled. Large sample sizes and accurate flow information are indispensable for analyses
of the TWA industry, because the latter still accounts for only a small employment share in the
economy and is characterized by high rates of labor turnover. Moreover, typical problems besetting
longitudinal survey data, such as panel mortality due to non-responses, or memory gaps in restro-
spective questions are not encountered in the IABES2 (Bender, Haas, and Klose, 2000), which will
prove very useful in the current application.
However, the IABES2 also has a number of potential short-comings for the present analysis
that need to be addressed. First, TWA workers cannot be differentiated from the mere admin-
istrative personnel of TWA firms in the dataset. However, this shortcoming is unlikely to be of
major practical importance. Second, as the TWA firm alone issues the statutory employment
notifications, the IABES2 neither contains information on client firms, nor work assignments of
TWA workers. However, we will argue in Section 5.1.2 that this data deficiency is not really a
disadvantage in the present analysis of the stepping-stone function of temporary agency work, in
part because of the empirical strategy chosen. Nevertheless, lack of information on client firms
implies that we are unable to tell whether a successful transition to regular employment occurred
to a former client firm or not. As a consequence, we may not directly test the relative importance
of the screening hypothesis for the stepping-stone function of TWA work. However, the object of
the present analysis is deliberately chosen to be both more general and more fundamental, in that
we test for the existence and the quantitative importance of the overall bridging function of TWA
work, leaving an assessment of the relative importance of different explanations put forward for its
alleged existence for future research. Given the paucity of empirical evidence on the stepping-stone
function of TWA work, this is a natural starting point to take. Finally, covering only employment
relationships that are subject to social security contributions, civil servants, the self-employed, and
those in marginal dependent employment are not included in the IABES2.
The present evaluation problem of whether, and if so, to what extent TWA employment helps
formerly unemployed workers find regular employment raises several methodological questions that
have to be addressed. In Section 5.1, we discuss in detail its peculiar features in comparison to
the standard evaluation problem, and in doing so, define key terms, such as treatment and non-
treatment status (the counterfactual for the treated), outcome measures, and the like. This permits
us to formulate testable causal questions about the stepping-stone function of TWA work, subject
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to the restrictions imposed by the nature of phenomenon under investigation and the data available.
Sample selection issues will be addressed in the course of this discussion, so that a presentation of
summary statistics on major variables recorded in the data is deferred until then.
5 The Evaluation Problem
5.1 Evaluating the Stepping-Stone Function of TWA Work
The standard administered social experiment is conducted only once, with a specific starting and
ending date, clearly circumscribed in the nature and scope of the treatment provided therein (e.g.
a particular one-time retraining programme for a certain skill group of workers), and linked to
specific formal eligibility requirements for participation. None of these features, however, apply to
the present evaluation problem. As an on-going programme, unemployed workers may join TWA
work both at different calendar dates and at different individual elapsed unemployment durations.
In addition, employment spells in the TWA industry vary endogenously in length. An unemployed
worker may also hold a TWA job more than once, and thus be subject to multiple treatments
with interspersed repeated spells of unemployment. As a consequence, one and the same worker
may both be counted as treated at one point in time and as non-treated at another. Moreover,
TWA workers may be assigned to different numbers of client firms for different durations and for
different tasks, rendering TWA employment heterogeneous across workers in a number of respects
that are endogenously determined but post entry. Formal requirements for participation are largely
absent, with general ’profitable employability’, a function of both individual characteristics of the
unemployed job-seeker and general labor market conditions, alone being decisive for temporary
work agencies in the recruitment process.
The definition of outcomes is equally beset with difficulties. Above all, the question to be
addressed is when one should start to measure outcomes, both for those treated and for those not
treated. For the former, the more obvious choice is between the start of a TWA employment spell
and its end, depending on how TWA employment is valued relative to regular employment or the
specific causal question asked. For those workers not treated, the case is even more ambiguous, as
neither entry date to nor exit date from TWA work are observed. These specific features inevitably
require choices to be made with respect to the timing, as well as the definition of potential treatment
and control groups. This we do in the remainder of this section, beginning with the units (workers)
to be analyzed, i.e. the sample selected.
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5.1.1 Sample Selection
For the ensuing analysis, we select all individuals who in 1994 to 1996 register as unemployed
and consider only their first unemployment spell in this period. This allows us to observe the
subsequent employment histories of those workers for an extended period of time in the IABES2
(up to a minimum total of 5 years). Entries into unemployment are sampled over a three year
period to increase the absolute number of subsequent transitions to TWA work observed in the
data. The years of entry chosen have the advantage to sufficiently predate the 1997 reform of
the LoPA, which, among other things, introduced a one-time exemption to the general recall ban
in the TWA industry. We further restrict this inflow sample to individuals who are between 18
and 55 years of age at the time of unemployment registration. The upper age limit is imposed so
as to reduce the likelihood of sampling older workers who may be entitled to some form of early
retirement scheme that permits them to exit unemployment straight into inactivity without having
to search for a job or accept job offers by the public employment service while drawing benefits.
Furthermore, we exclude workers that lack some prior employment experience. This measure is
imperative given the data collection process, for important worker attributes, in particular the
educational-vocational qualification obtained, are recorded in employment notifications issued by
employers, but not in the information collected in and contributed to the IABES2 from the federal
unemployment register.
These restrictions leave us with a total of 101,475 workers in the sample selected that enter
unemployment between 1994 and 1996. Summary statistics on major variables for this sample
recorded at the time of inflow into unemployment are provided in Table 6 in the appendix. As
documented in Table 1 below, 2.4% of these unemployment spells are right-censored at the end
of 2001, and 11.7% end with no subsequent transition recorded within the sampling period 1994
to 2001. 82.8% of all unemployed workers enter a regular job, almost nine out of ten within one
month of deregistering from unemployment. Another 3.2% of the unemployed leave for a TWA
job, the great majority (85.2%) again within one month.
It is noteworthy that a much larger fraction, or 8.1% of all entries into unemployment (9.4% of
all subsequent transitions) at some point until December 2001 do in fact take up a job in the TWA
sector. With close to one in ten unemployed workers joining TWA work over this period, TWA
employment appears to be more dispersed in the working population than its still small employment
share in the economy suggests. In addition, but not shown in the Table 1, 84.2% of all direct entries
into TWA work (those who enter within one month of exiting from unemployment), do eventually
find regular employment within the sampling period. The latter statistic is especially important in
the present context, for a high ”frequency of transitions from temporary to permanent employment
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Table 1: Subsequent transitions to TWA and regular employment of unemployment inflows in 1994
- 1996
Group of workers Absolute number Share (%)
Total entries into unemployment: 101,475 100
with right-censored unemployment spells in 2001 2,401 2.4
with no subsequent record in sampling period 11,880 11.7
... who enter TWA work:
within < 1 month of exiting unemployment 2,728 2.7
after ≥ 1 month of exiting unemployment 473 0.5
at some point within sampling period 8,200 8.1
... who enter regular work:
within < 1 month of exiting unemployment 72,460 71.4
after ≥ 1 month of exiting unemployment 11,539 11.4
Source: IABES2.
suggests that the size of any permanent ”underclass” of temporary workers must be small” (Segal
and Sullivan, 1997a, p. 123). No subsequent transitions out of TWA work are observed for only
3.2% of direct entries into TWA employment. Moreover, only a third of these 3.2% are accounted
for by right-censored TWA employment spells at the end of the sampling period. TWA job spells
last for an average of 254 days, or 8.4 months, and are therefore very short indeed.
However, past work experience in the TWA sector seems to affect the probability of renewed
entry into TWA work. As Table 2 shows, 16.4% of workers with some prior TWA work experience
exit unemployment for a TWA job, compared to only 2.4% of workers who never worked in the
TWA sector.
Table 2: Subsequent transitions to TWA and regular employment of unemployment inflows in 1994
- 1996 by prior TWA work experience
TWA work experience Subsequent transition to: No subsequent
prior to entry into Regular TWA transition
unemployment work any agency same as before observed
Anytime in the past 73.5% 16.4% — 10.2%
Entered unemployment 62.2% 29.5% 3.3% 8.3%
from TWA work
None 83.3% 2.4% — 14.3%
Source: IABES2.
An even larger fraction (29.5%) of workers that enter unemployment directly from TWA work
again take up a TWA job, but only one in nine of these return to their previous TWA. Thus
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a sizeable fraction of TWA workers, at least in the short to medium run, indeed appears to
cycle between unemployment and temporary agency work spells before eventually finding regular
employment. The vast majority of TWA workers, however, does not. Additional explorations, not
shown in Table 2, underscore the importance of the TWA submarket for labor market flows, and of
past TWA work experience for the likelihood of unemployed workers to enter TWA employment.
Workers with prior TWA work experience and workers who enter unemployment directly from
a TWA respectively account for 5.2% and 1.5% of all entries into unemployment and for 27.0%
and 14.1% of all observed subsequent transitions from unemployment to temporary agency work.
Recalls within the TWA industry, however, occur far less frequently than on the general labor
market. Only 3.3% of all workers last employed at a TWA in fact return to the same agency
when leaving unemployment. In contrast, 7.7% of workers entering unemployment from a regular
job again return to the same employer when deregistering from unemployment. The recall ban
imposed by the LoPA at the time is likely to be in the main accountable for this discrepancy, for a
significant share of former TWA workers, as we have seen, does in fact return to TWA work, albeit
not to the same employer.
In the remainder of this paper, we restrict the analysis to transitions of individual workers
to other labor market states (regular and TWA employment) that occur within less than one
month of deregistering from unemployment. Apart from workers with some prior unemployment
experience, we also retain workers in the analysis that have been employed in the TWA sector,
i.e. "treated", before entering unemployment in 1994 to 1996, because of the scale of reentry into
TWA work documented above. Exclusion of either of these two groups of workers from the analysis
would very likely result in above-average productivity individuals being sampled. It would also
restrict the treatment effect investigated to a significantly reduced subsample of TWA inflows from
unemployment. From a policy perspective, however, this subsample does not necessarily represent
the group of unemployed workers mostly concerned with in the context of the stepping-stone
function of TWA work.
5.1.2 Treatment and Non-Treatment Status
With respect to the definition and the timing of the treatment, we consider the first entry of
workers into TWA employment after having registered as unemployed in 1994 to 1996. Any
subsequent treatments are thus taken as outcomes of the initial treatment. More specifically, we
define treatment as entry into TWA employment, also called the intent of treatment. The causal
effects of TWA work are therefore assumed to set in upon entry into the sector. We thereby
disregard differences in TWA employment experience across workers (e.g. in terms of employment
duration, number of work assignments, etc.), and focus instead on the overall or average effects
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of joining TWA work on the subsequent labor market prospects of workers. Practical restrictions
imposed by the data, notably the complete lack of information on client assignments, in part
dictate this approach. However, one may argue for the definition of treatment adopted also on
purely methodological grounds. For, in contrast to the standard programme, virtually all aspects
of TWA employment relationships formed are ultimately determined endogenously, depending on
the post-entry decisions of both the temporary work agency and the TWA worker.1 Moreover,
the available, albeit limited evidence for Germany on the distribution of client assignments across
TWA workers and on the transitions of TWA workers to regular employment suggests that the
ability of TWA workers to sample many potential employers during temporary work assignments
and the ability of client firms to screen TWA workers during such work assignments for permanent
positions may not in fact be of primary importance for the acclaimed stepping-stone function of
TWA work. As the case study by Kvasnicka (2003) has shown, most TWA workers have but a
singular client assignment, while first evidence on the recently created PSA in Germany reveals
that in fact less than a fourth of all transitions out of TWA work into regular employment occurred
to a former client firm (Jahn and Windsheimer, 2004).
Outcomes, yet to be defined, are consequently measured from the month of entry into TWA
work for those actually receiving treatment. This raises the question, as to when one should
start to measure outcomes for those not observed to enter TWA work. Theory suggests that
unemployed workers conduct their job search sequentially, accepting or declining a particular job
offer depending on the respective net payoffs associated with either decision. There is in addition
ample evidence that TWA workers in the majority prefer regular employment to holding a job in
the TWA industry,2 largely because of the higher pay and superior working conditions expected
to accrue in the former. Moreover, surveys reveal that TWA workers frequently enter TWA work
after a period of unsuccessful search for a regular job, and because they hope to thereby improve
their chances to find regular employment (see, for example, IWG, 1995; CIETT, 2000; Cohany,
1998). In other words, unemployed workers are likely to decide sequentially, whether or not to
enter TWA work in a given month of unemployment. This implies that for the construction of
an adequate control group for those actually observed to enter TWA work in a given month of
elapsed unemployment duration (u1), only those unemployed workers should be chosen as potential
controls that have been unemployed for at least u0 and are not treated in u0, where u0 ≥ u1. Note
however that these workers may well enter TWA work and therefore be treated at a later month of
elapsed unemployment duration. Thus while controls can be treated themselves at a later stage,
treated workers may never subsequently become controls for workers that enter TWA work at
1 In addition, these aspects are varying over the course of the TWA employment relationship.
2See, for example, Storrie (2002) for the European evidence, Finegold, Levenson, and van Buren (2003) for the
US, Hegewish (2002) for the UK, or IWG (1995) for Germany.
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longer unemployment durations.
As individual months of entry into TWA work (treatment) differ across workers, we adopt a
relative time scale in measuring subsequent outcomes (the effects of the treatment) for the treated.
For a matched control person, outcomes are measured from the observed u1 of the treated worker.
However, as u1, i.e. elapsed unemployment duration before entry into TWA work, is an unobserved
counterfactual for non-treated unemployed workers, it cannot be included as a regressor in the
estimation of the propensity score. Nevertheless, we still condition the construction of matches
on elapsed unemployment duration by estimating separate propensity scores for every month (u),
each based on those treated in u and those not treated in u (see the matching protocol in the
appendix). This approach is equivalent to estimating a discrete hazard rate model, where all
estimated parameters are allowed to be duration-specific (Sianesi, 2004, p.140).
Choosing potential controls from such a duration-based flow sample has an inherent advantage
in the present context over the primary alternative comparison group design employed in the eval-
uation literature, i.e. the exclusive selection of potential controls from among those workers never
observed to enter the particular programme investigated. For in the latter case the construction of
a comparison group is in fact conditioning on the future and thus the outcome when programme
starts are not restricted to a particular period (see Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) on this point).
In the current application, this would introduce a downward bias in the estimated treatment effect
of TWA work on regular employment probabilities, as unemployed workers that act as controls are
likely to be never observed to enter TWA work simply because they have instead made a successful
transition to regular employment. We next formalize these ideas in the form of the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT) to be estimated in the present context, deferring a discussion of
the different outcome measures employed in this study to the subsequent subsection.
5.1.3 Formal Specification of the Evaluation Problem (ATT, CIA)
We formalize the evaluation problem based on Sianesi’s (2001/2004) exposition in her application
of statistical matching techniques to the evaluation of the effectiveness of active labor market
programmes in Sweden. The outcomes of interest are various labor market states of individuals
over time, i.e.
{
Y
(u)
jt
}T
t=u+1
, where j denotes the type of outcome, i.e. the particular labor market
status considered, and t = u + 1, .., T are the months these outcomes are measured post elapsed
unemployment duration of at least u months. At time u, the population of interest comprises
workers with elapsed unemployment duration of at least u months. Treatment assignment is
denoted by Du = {1, 0}, with Du = 1 for unemployed workers who join TWA work in u, and
Du = 0 for those unemployed job seekers who have elapsed unemployment duration of at least
u and do not join TWA work in u. We further denote the potential labor market states of an
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individual at time t, where t > u, that joins TWA work in her u’th month of unemployment with
Y
1(u)
jt and with Y
0(u)
jt if an individual has not joined TWA work up to that month, respectively.
The average treatment effects on the treated (ATTs), ∆ujt, in the present application then
correspond to the average effect of joining TWA work in month u of elapsed unemployment duration(
Y
1(u)
jt
)
compared to not joining TWA work in that month
(
Y
0(u)
jt
)
for those unemployed workers
who actually take up a TWA job in that same month (Du = 1), i.e.:
∆ujt ≡ E
(
Y
1(u)
jt − Y
0(u)
jt
∣∣∣Du = 1)
= E
(
Y
1(u)
jt
∣∣∣Du = 1)−E (Y 0(u)jt
∣∣∣Du = 1) for t = u+ 1, ..., T. (1)
As discussed in Section ??, we have to assume stable unit treatment value and conditional
independence to identify the second term in equation (1), i.e. the unobserved counterfactual. The
latter assumption, in formal terms, requires that:
Y
0(u)
jt ⊥ D
u
∣∣∣X = x for t = u+ 1, ..., T, (2)
i.e. for observably similar individuals (X = x) having reached the same elapsed unemployment
duration (u), the distribution of potential non-participation outcomes (Y
0(u)
jt ) is the same for
unemployed workers entering TWA work (Du = 1) and unemployed workers not entering TWA
work
(
D(u) = 0
)
in month u. Common support in the present context amounts to the condition
that:
0 < Pr(Du = 1|X) < 1. (3)
In other words, conditional on elapsed unemployment duration and individual worker charac-
teristics of interest, a potential control has to exist for each treated individual. In the empirical
analysis, we set U = 12, i.e. we investigate the effect of taking up a TWA job within one year
of registering as unemployed in the period 1994 to 1996. Restricting the period workers are fol-
lowed while still in unemployment is necessary to have a sufficiently long period at one’s disposal in
which the subsequent labor market outcomes of these workers can be studied in the IABES2. With
data until December 2001, this restriction provides us with at least 48 months for each individual
worker, irrespective of the particular calendar months she entered and exited her unemployment
spell. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, the total number of transitions from unemployment
to TWA work declines rapidly with elapsed months of unemployment duration. In fact, about
two-thirds, i.e. 66.0%, or 1801 out of the 2728 transitions to TWA employment in the sampling
period 1994 to 2001 take place within the first year of unemployment.
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Figure 1: Treated unemployed workers by month of entry into TWA work
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5.1.4 Outcomes
To gain a comprehensive view of how the future labor market prospects of unemployed workers in
Germany are affected by taking up a job in the TWA industry, we employ a set of four different
outcomes measures
(
Y
(u)
jt
)
, described in Table 3 below. These respectively forty-eight monthly
post-treatment probabilities of regular employment, TWA employment, any type of employment
(regular or TWA), and unemployment allow us to study the dynamics of the effects TWA employ-
ment exerts on the individual likelihoods of observing these states over time.
Table 3: Definition of outcome measures
Outcomes for each month up to 4 years post treatment:
Outcome 1 Monthly probability of regular employment
Outcome 2 Monthly probability of TWA employment
Outcome 3 Monthly probability of employment (TWA or regular)
Outcome 4 Monthly probability of unemployment
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It is important to note that these monthly outcome measures refer to the respective probabilities
of observing workers in a particular labor market state at any point in time during a particular
month. As workers may naturally spend time in more than one of these labor market states in a
given month, Outcomes 1, 2, and 4 are not mutually exclusive, and therefore do not necessarily add
up to one for a particular group of workers. Moreover, workers that return to education, or general
inactivity, i.e. states which are not recorded in the IABES2, are retained in the respective monthly
base groups from which the four outcome measures are calculated. This design was inspired by a
number of reasons.
First, employment spells are measured with daily accuracy in the IABES2. Unlike the situation
encountered in monthly survey data, this inevitably requires a deliberate choice as to when exactly
one should measure individual outcomes on a monthly basis. The primary alternative to the
approach taken in this study would be to (arbitrarily) pick certain dates, be it the start or end
of individual months, for measuring the outcomes of interest. The main drawback of such a
design is that workers, by virtue of legal restrictions on employment termination in Germany,
tend to be laid off or quit either at the 15th of a month or at its very end. As a consequence,
measuring outcomes at the start (end), or in the first (second) half of individual months would
introduce a negative (positive) bias in the estimates of monthly unemployment probabilities of
groups of workers that exhibit a higher probability of employment termination over time. The
reverse, in turn, would hold true for the respective monthly employment probabilities of this same
group of workers. Ignoring this contingency is objectionable on methodological grounds, because it
implies to condition a priori the analysis on assumed posterior outcomes yet to be investigated. In
addition, this problem is likely to be a non-negligible one in the current context, for as documented
in Section 5.1.1, TWA employment spells on average tend to be extremely short and frequently
lead to renewed employment in the sector after intermittent spells of unemployment. Last but not
least, the monthly chances of workers to be in either of the four states correspond more intuitively
to the type of measurement adopted here, than to one that is based on likelihoods obtained from
considering only a thirtieth of the respective reference periods, i.e. a single day.
Second, and by virtue of the data generation process, we have complete information on the em-
ployment (TWA and regular) and unemployment trajectories of workers over time that comprise
our individual outcome measures of interest, i.e. employment subject to social security contri-
butions and unemployment periods involving some sort of entitlement to financial support from
the public authorities. As pointed out in Section 4, longitudinal survey data in contrast generally
suffers from panel mortality due to nonresponses that prevents researchers from observing the true
labor market states of individuals, i.e. the outcomes of interest. Monthly probabilities for indi-
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vidual outcome measures in this case have to be calculated conditional on observing workers at
the various sampling dates, which complicates the interpretation of the results obtained, i.e. the
individual probabilities estimated. Accounting for this type of sample attrition in fact necessitates
extensive additional explorations and in general introduces uncertainty about the robustness of
the results obtained (see Sianesi (2004) for various steps employed to obtain bounds on the likely
biases introduced by this measurement problem). The current application, in contrast, does not
suffer from such a drawback. It therefore requires workers not observed in individual outcome
months in the IABES2 to be retained in the monthly base groups from which the four probability
measures are calculated, given the causal questions of interest, and the accuracy of the IABES2 in
recording the four labor market states necessary to address them empirically.
While Outcome 1 is of primary interest for the empirical assessment of the stepping-stone
function of TWA work, the remainder does provide important supportive evidence in this context.
Outcome 2 provides information on the degree to which workers remain or tend to get stuck
in the TWA sector over time, whereas Outcome 3 conveys information on overall employment
probabilities. The latter is of interest in its own right, for even if treated workers turn out not
to benefit in their likelihood of obtaining regular work, or to suffer from increased risk of future
unemployment (Outcome 4), they might still prove to enjoy relatively higher chances of employment
in general.
5.2 Implementation of Propensity Score Matching
5.2.1 Nearest-Neighbor Matching
We apply nearest-neighbor propensity score matching without replacement, but within caliper
(Cochran and Rubin, 1973).3 In other words, conditional on elapsed unemployment duration
u, each treated individual i in month u is matched to that non-treated individual z with the
closest estimated propensity score p(X) and used as a control Ci for individual i, subject to the
condition that the absolute difference in the two estimated propensity scores, i.e. the degree of
residual mismatch, does not exceed a certain maximum Ψ, or caliper (see, for example, Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999, p. 1954):
Ci = z|Ψ > min
zǫ{1,...,N0}
‖pi(X)− pz(X)‖ . (4)
In the empirical analysis, we set the caliper to Ψ = 0.03. From these pairs of treated and
control individuals, the nearest-neighbor matching estimator estimates the j times t ATTs (∆ujt)
for each entry month into TWA work, i.e. u, as the difference in mean outcomes between between
3The matching estimator ’psmatch2’ by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) for STATA is used and adapted to the specific
features of the present evaluation problem.
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treated and matched controls:
∆ujt =
1
Nu1
Nu1∑
i=1
(
y
1(u)
jt − y
0(u)
jt
)
, (5)
where Nu1 is the number of matched treated workers with completed unemployment duration
u. Assuming independent observations, homoskedasticity of the outcome variables within the
treatment and control groups, and non-dependence of the variance of the outcome on the propensity
score (Lechner, 2001), the variances of the ATTs, ∆ujt can then be calculated as (see Sianesi, 2001,
p. 28):4
V ar
(
∆ujt
)
=
1
Nu1
V ar
(
Y
1(u)
jt
∣∣∣Du = 1)+
∑Nu0
z=1
ω2z
(Nu1)2
V ar
(
Y
0(u)
jt
∣∣∣Du = 0) , (6)
where Du = 1 and Du = 0 denote matched treated and non-treated workers at time u, respectively,
and ωz is the number of times individual z is being used as a control, with
∑Nu0
z=1
ωz = Nu1. As
matching is conducted without replacement to reduce the standard errors of the estimated effects,
however, ωz = 1 for all controls, so that
∑Nu0
z=1
ω2z = N
u1, too. As the true propensity score is
unknown, its estimate has to be used, which leads to reduced estimated variances of the ATTs.
Standard errors may be obtained by bootstrapping, which, however, is not pursued here for the
amount of computing time required. A description of the actual matching protocol used is provided
in the appendix.
5.2.2 Estimating the Propensity Score
The plausibility of the CIA in equation (2) depends on the richness of the available data with
respect to the underlying mechanism that determines treatment assignment and future outcomes,
i.e. the ability to control for all factors that both determine selection into TWA work and affect
potential outcomes in the two participation states. We discuss these factors in relation to the two
principal actors involved, i.e. the TWA and the unemployed job-seeker, the potential restrictions
imposed on their conduct by the LoPA, as well as the general labour market conditions they are
confronted with.
The TWA: As pointed out before, few formal requirements besides general ’profitable employa-
bility’, a function of both individual characteristics of the unemployed job-seeker and general labor
4Note, however, that unlike Sianesi (2001), we do not have to condition on treated workers being observed at
individual outcome months in this case, as we do not have any measurement error in the labor market states of
interest that underylie our outcome measures (see Section 5.1.4).
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market conditions, are relevant for temporary work agencies in the recruitment process. Deferring
a discussion of the latter for the time being, the former necessitates the consideration of attributes
related to the productivity of individuals in the estimation of the propensity score. Besides per-
sonal characteristics, i.e. age, sex, foreign nationality, and marital status, as well as the highest
educational and vocational attainment recorded for the worker, we control for the previous (recent
and more distant) labor market history of individuals in the estimation of the propensity score.
With respect to the last employment relationship, we control for employment tenure, real earnings,
real average earnings in the last establishment, type of occupation held, part-time status, industrial
sector, and whether the last job was a TWA job. The latter in particular appeared quite signifi-
cant in the descriptive explorations of observed transitions from unemployment to TWA work in
Section 5.1.1. Information on the last sector the worker was employed, in turn, is likely to capture
human capital and work experience that might be of use in the mainly manual, industrial tasks
TWA workers are usually assigned to at client firms. In addition, and by virtue of the dataset,
key summary statistics with respect to individuals’ more distant labor market history are con-
structed. Attributes that are controlled for include whether the individual has ever worked in the
TWA sector before and whether the worker has ever been unemployed before. The latter acts as a
proxy for past instability of employment, and possibly for the degree of labor market attachment of
the worker, which itself may be related to unobserved individual characteristics related to worker
productivity. Furthermore, a dummy for unemployment registration in the new German Länder
is included, where TWAs have only been able to operate from 1990 onwards, and annual as well
as seasonal indicators are used to capture cyclical and seasonal variations in the demand of TWAs
for manpower. By virtue of conditioning on elapsed unemployment durations in the estimation
of the propensity score, we also implicitly control for unobservables correlated with the duration
of unemployment, such as average time-invariant and time-variant differences in individual worker
productivity not captured by our other covariates measured only at entry into unemployment.
The unemployed job-seeker: The aforementioned factors are also likely to affect the partic-
ipation decision and future labor market outcomes of unemployed job-seekers at a given time.
Elapsed unemployment duration is of primary importance in this context. First, as pointed out in
the introduction, surveys regularly find unsuccessful search for a regular job to be one of the most
important motives for taking up work in the TWA sector, thereby lending support to the notion
of sequential decision taking on the part of unemployed job-seekers of whether or not to join TWA
work. Second, benefit entitlement levels, and thus the reservation wage, decline with elapsed un-
employed duration. As remuneration in the TWA sector generally falls short of levels attainable in
other industries, workers with prolonged unemployment spells, and thus a lower reservation wage,
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should be more likely to take up a TWA job than workers who have just entered unemployment.
Third, elapsed unemployment duration provides an upper bound on individual unobserved ability,
as more productive workers are on average more likely to exit unemployment quickly. And finally,
job search activity and more generally ’drive’ are likely to decline with prolonged unemployment,
as workers become discouraged. The latter raises the attractiveness of turning to TWAs who each
manage a whole portfolio of potential job opportunities. Registering in the new German Länder
and the local unemployment rate at entry are likely to have an effect on the employment oppor-
tunities of individual job-seekers, both in the TWA sector and other industries. We also control
for the real gross daily earnings workers received at their last employer before entering into unem-
ployment. These proxy individual worker productivity, and affect benefit entitlement levels as well
as potential aspiration wages when searching for a new job in unemployment. As Kvasnicka and
Werwatz (2002) have shown, relative earnings of workers that enter TWA employment on average
fall short of those of otherwise comparable workers even two to three years before actually entering
temporary work. We in addition control for the type of entitlements received by a worker in a
particular month of elapsed unemployment duration, i.e. unemployment benefits, unemployment
assistance, or unemployment support. The first is limited in duration and generally exceeds the
latter two in financial terms. Eligibility for benefit entitlements is conditional on past employment,
and its level depends on the last income earned.
Restrictions imposed by the LoPA: The only restriction in fact imposed by the LoPA before
2004 on the conduct of TWAs in the recruitment process was the recall ban, which prohibited an
agency to rehire a laid-off worker within three months of prior employment termination.5 This
ban was not eased until April 1997 (see also Jahn and Rudolph, 2002). By virtue of sampling only
inflows into unemployment between 1994 and 1996, however, the reform is in fact immaterial for
subsequent transitions of workers out of this spell of unemployment. However, we may not directly
account for this regulatory constraint on the recruitment behavior of TWAs in the estimation of
the propensity scores by way of a dummy variable that takes the value one if less than three
months have elapsed since a worker has been laid off by a TWA, and zero otherwise. For we run
separate probit regressions for each elapsed month of unemployment. As a consequence, in months
of unemployment greater than three, this indicator will always take the value zero, i.e. we will
have no variation in the data, as the recall ban ceases to be binding for all workers still unemployed
after three months. However, in the context of our matching algorithm, we would expect to have
immediately preceding employment in the TWA sector less of a positive effect on the probability
5As we have seen in Section 5.1.1, recalls indeed occur much less frequently in the TWA sector than in the
economy at large (see also Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1.2 for additional evidence from our case study).
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to reenter TWA work in the first three months of unemployment than in the fourth, if the recall
ban does indeed have a material effect. We do, in fact, find such evidence (see Table 7 in the
appendix.).
General Labor Market Conditions: General labor market conditions influence both the
search behavior and potential employment chances of unemployed job-seekers, as well as the re-
cruitment decisions of TWA agencies. Labor demand of TWA firms is also known to be both
highly procyclical and subject to strong seasonal variations. We control for general labor market
conditions along three dimensions: cyclical, seasonal, and regional. Cyclical and seasonal factors
are controlled for by annual and quarterly indicator variables, measured at entry into unemploy-
ment to account for differences in the inflow composition of workers into unemployment. The
average annual unemployment rate in the employment office district where the worker registers
as unemployed, in turn, is used to capture differences in local labor market imbalances. Finally,
recorded unemployment registration in the new German Länder proxies for persistent structural
differences between East and West Germany.
A note is in order on a problem, which is commonly encountered in evaluation studies, i.e.
anticipatory effects of future treatment on the behavior of workers that are later treated, and its
likely pervasiveness in the current application. Anticipatory effects of unemployed job-seekers,
leading to reduced job search prior to entry into TWA work (akin to Ashenfelter’s dip), should
not be a major problem in the present evaluation problem of the stepping-stone function of TWA
work. For TWAs in Germany tend to hire workers predominantly on-call in line with current levels
of client demand (see Kvasnicka, 2003), which is unlikely to be predictable with certainty even
one or two weeks in advance. In addition, worker recalls on the TWA submarket at the time were
prohibited by the recall ban within three months of prior employment termination.
5.2.3 Matching Quality
The regression output of the probit estimations of the propensity scores for a number of treatment
months are provided in Table 7 in the appendix. All covariates except current entitlement status are
measured at entry into unemployment. In particular, previous TWA work experience and direct
entry into unemployment from a TWA job have a sizeable and statistically significant positive
effect on the probability of transition to a TWA job. Previous real earnings and wage levels at the
last employer, as well as the local unemployment rate, in contrast, surprisingly never exert any
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of treatment assignment. The latter finding may
be the product of two countervailing effects of local labor market conditions on the probability
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of treatment. While unemployed job-seekers may be more willing to accept a TWA job, when
other employment opportunities are scarce, TWAs may only be inclined to recruit more workers
when client demand for their services is high, i.e. local labor market conditions are tight. Workers
who spent less than one year in their last job, which proxies for past instability of employment,
turn out to be at times more likely to enter TWA work, potentially for the otherwise reduced
chances to find employment and lack of sufficient occupation-specific skills acquired in their last
job. Workers entering unemployment from training also appear to be more inclined to take up a
TWA job in the first months of their unemployment spells. TWA work thus indeed appears to
provide an access-to-work function for recent labor market entrants. It is important to keep in
mind that all estimated probit regressions are conditional on treated and non-treated workers in the
respective subsamples to have reached the same elapsed duration of unemployment. As the latter is
likely to be correlated both with observable and unobservable worker characteristics, the respective
monthly subsamples should already be more homogeneous than the full groups of treated and non-
treated workers sampled for the entire first twelve months of elapsed unemployment duration. As a
consequence, the estimated coefficients of the observable attributes controlled for in the individual
probit regressions measure only the impact of these covariates on the probability of treatment
assignment conditional on elapsed unemployment duration.
Following Sianesi (2004), Table 4 provides various summary statistics on covariate balancing
and thus matching quality for all 12 probit regressions. Given the very large groups of potential
controls available for each unemployment month (column 3), finding a suitable match partner for
treated individual is not a problem. Only 2 out of the 1801 workers leaving unemployment for
a TWA job, as shown in column 10, are excluded for lack of common support. The pseudo-R2
from the individual probit regressions before matching (column 4) indicate the extent to which
the covariates explain the probability of treatment in a particular month of unemployment. The
respective pseudo-R2 from monthly probit regressions after matching (column 5) show that on
average over the twelve probits run, the covariates continue to explain only 7% of the variance in
treatment assignment across the matched subsamples, and thus only half the average respective
figure obtained from the original samples of treated and non-treated workers. Associated prob-
ability values of likelihood ratio tests before and after matching are reported in columns 6 and
7. Whereas before matching, the joint significance of the covariates is never rejected for any of
our twelve probit regressions, it is always rejected after matching. Matching on the estimated
propensity scores leads to significant improvements in the balancing of attributes between treated
and (potential) control workers in the matched subsamples for each unemployment month u, with
median absolute standardized biases on average being reduced by a factor of three to four after
21
matching compared to the situation before matching (columns 8 and 9).6
Table 4: Statistics by month on covariate balancing, before and after matching
Treated Nontreated Probit Probit Median Median Treated workers
workers workers ps.-R
2
ps.-R
2
Pr>χ2 Pr>χ2 bias bias lost to CS
Month (u) before before before after before after before after after
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1 203 90463 0.100 0.032 0.000 0.989 17.2 5.7 0
2 324 80813 0.134 0.028 0.000 0.891 21.6 5.4 0
3 260 69869 0.118 0.015 0.000 1.000 22.7 4.3 1
4 221 63723 0.169 0.027 0.000 0.993 24.8 4.6 0
5 197 58358 0.151 0.032 0.000 0.990 21.9 4.7 0
6 139 53884 0.128 0.046 0.000 0.988 21.3 6.1 0
7 111 49822 0.133 0.049 0.000 0.998 23.7 5.6 0
8 85 43760 0.124 0.113 0.000 0.697 26.0 9.4 0
9 60 42784 0.118 0.145 0.000 0.839 23.3 10.3 0
10 70 40659 0.154 0.112 0.000 0.912 26.6 9.6 1
11 74 37268 0.117 0.093 0.000 0.964 26.0 7.5 0
12 57 35596 0.140 0.189 0.000 0.574 30.9 8.6 0
Note: before = before matching, after = after matching.
(4), (5): Pseudo-R
2
from probit regressions for the monthly conditional treatment probability.
(6), (7): P-value of likelihood ratio tests for the joint significance of regressors.
(8), (9): Median absolute standardized biases taken over all regressors.
Source: IABES2.
6 Empirical Findings
6.1 Summarizing Outcomes Over Time
We begin with a graphical summary of the average time pattern of the different treatment effects,
before presenting the results for the respective ∆ujt by month of entry into TWA work in Section
6.2, i.e. the causal effects identified under the CIA in equation (2). Following Sianesi (2004, p.
140), an average effect on each outcome measure j in outcome month t may be derived for the
entire group of workers treated in their first twelve months of unemployment as:
EU
(
∆ujt
∣∣D = 1) =
U=12∑
u=1
[
E
(
Y
1(u)
jt − Y
0(u)
jt
∣∣∣Du = 1)P (Du = 1|D = 1)] , (7)
where E
(
Y
1(u)
jt − Y
0(u)
jt
∣∣∣Du = 1) = ∆ujt, which are weighted in the summation by the monthly
6The median is taken over all regressors and calculated for each unemployment month u following Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985) as: BiasBefore (X) =
X¯1−X¯0√
[(V1(X)+V1(X))/2]
× 100 before matching and as BiasAfter (X) =
X¯M
1
−X¯M
0√
[(V1(X)+V1(X))/2]
×100 after matching, where X¯1 and X¯0 are the respective sample means in the entire subsamples
of treated and nontreated workers, V1 (X) and V1 (X) their associated variances, and X¯M1 and X¯
M
0 the respective
sample means in the group of matched treated individuals within the common support and nontreated individuals,
i.e. controls (see Sianesi, 2004, p. 154).
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entry distribution into TWA work for those actually leaving unemployment for TWA work, i.e.
P (Du = 1|D = 1). The following subsections graph estimates of these average monthly effects
on our four outcome measures together with 95% confidence intervals calculated on the basis
of equation (6) for the entire population of individuals treated in their first twelve months of
unemployment. These graphs summarize how unemployed job-seekers who take up TWA work
on average fared in their subsequent employment and unemployment trajectories by joining TWA
work relative to the counterfactual situation in which they would have continued their job search
in registered unemployment. Estimates of these treatment effects on our four outcome measures
are reported in Table 8 in the appendix for selected months post treatment.
6.1.1 Outcome 1: Probability of Regular Employment
Figure 2 shows that entering a TWA job has no statistically significant effect, in the short run or
long run, on the monthly probabilities of regular employment. In other words, neither a stepping-
stone effect of TWA employment, nor an adverse effect on future probabilities of regular employ-
ment is discernable. If anything, TWA work tends to reduce the relative chances of being in a
regular job in the first seven months, a differential effect that subsequently turns slightly positive,
fluctuating around two percentage points.
Figure 2: Treatment effects over time on the probability of regular employment
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Source: IABES2. - - - denote 95% confidence intervals.
The estimated reduced probabilities of regular employment are most likely the result of a lock-
in-effect of programme participation, as TWA employment spells of treated workers on average last
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for less than 8.5 months, as pointed out before, and thus only marginally longer than the period in
which the estimated difference in the probability of regular employment is negative. However, while
some unemployed workers entering TWA work might still be employed in their job at later outcome
months, others may also cycle between different TWA jobs. As a consequence, while inspection
of Figure 2 provides evidence against the stepping stone hypothesis of TWA work, it does not
give an answer as to whether unemployed workers benefit in their overall future probability of
employment, be it regular or temporary agency work employment, from entering a TWA job from
unemployment. Having explored the former constituent part of this outcome measure in Figure 2,
we next turn to the latter component (Outcome 2), before considering both parts in combination,
i.e. Outcome 3.
6.1.2 Outcome 2: Probability of TWA Employment
As is evident from Figure 3, individuals leaving unemployment for TWA work are significantly
more likely throughout the four year period after they entered agency work to be employed in
the TWA sector. While the treatment effect declines rapidly over the first eight to nine months,
its decline becomes subsequently less marked and roughly stabilizes after two years at around 17
percentage points.
Figure 3: Treatment effects over time on the probability of TWA employment
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Source: IABES2. - - - denote 95% confidence intervals.
While prolonged program duration and repeated program participation may in general be a
matter of concern if it keeps those workers from obtaining regular work, this does not seem to be
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the case in the present context. For as we have seen in Figure 2, unemployed workers entering
TWA work on average do not exhibit statistically significant lower monthly probabilities of regular
employment than unemployed workers who chose not to join TWA work as yet.7
6.1.3 Outcome 3: Overall Probability of Employment
With respect to any social-security employment (TWA or regular), Figure 4 reveals that unem-
ployed workers who take up a TWA job exhibit a higher probability than those unemployed workers
who do not join TWA work in the same month of elapsed individual unemployment duration in
each month following entry into the TWA sector for the entire 4 year period under investigation.
Figure 4: Treatment effects over time on the probability of employment
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Source: IABES2. - - - denote 95% confidence intervals.
With Outcome 3 being a composite of Outcomes 1 and 2, and the general time pattern of
treatment effects discernable in Figures 3 and 4, it is evident that the overall monthly employ-
ment probabilities quite closely resemble the levels and trend of the increased likelihoods of TWA
employment for workers treated upon exit from unemployment. In sum, therefore, unemployed
job-seekers who take up a TWA job on average fare overall better in terms of average employment
probabilities over the 48-month period considered. It remains to be seen, however, how entry into
TWA work affects the risks of future unemployment over time. As argued before, our outcome
measures are neither mutually exclusive nor all inclusive, so that we cannot infer the treatment
7Moreover, as already noted in Section 5.1.1, only about 1% of entries to TWA work have right-censored TWA
employment spells at the end of the sampling period of the IABES2 (December 2001).
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effects of TWA work on a particular outcome from the treatment effects estimated for the other
outcomes.
6.1.4 Outcome 4: Probability of Unemployment
Figure 5 documents that monthly probabilities of unemployment are significantly reduced for
treated workers in their first six months after entering TWA work, then turn positive in the
second halves of the first and second year, before becoming statistically indifferent from the risks
of unemployment experienced by unemployed workers who have not joined TWA work as yet.
Figure 5: Treatment effects over time on the probability of unemployment
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Source: IABES2. - - - denote 95% confidence intervals.
Apart from the initial lock-in effect of program participation, therefore, treated workers do at
times appear to suffer from (albeit marginally) increased risks of unemployment, especially so in
the first two years, with a spike around the time of average employment duration in TWA work, but
increasingly converge in their future likelihood of unemployment to levels experienced by workers
that were not treated as of yet. As was the case with regular employment, therefore, taking up a
TWA job neither seems to worsen nor improve the long-term risks of unemployment for workers.
6.2 Treatment Effects by Month of Entry into TWA Work
Having so far explored the average dynamics of the different treatment effects, Table 5 reports the
respective causal effects averaged over the forty-eight outcome months for different entry months
into TWA work, as well as for the entire population of workers entering TWA work within their
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first twelve months of unemployment. The former correspond to the causal effects identified under
the CIA, equation (2), whereas the latter summarize Figures 2 to 5, i.e. relate to the entire group
of workers treated within their first year of unemployment and thus represent a benchmark against
which to discuss the variations in ATTs by month of entry into TWA work. Estimated baseline
outcome probabilities for the respective control groups corresponding to the different groups of
treated workers in Table 5 are provided in Table 9 in the appendix.
Table 5: Average treatment effects by unemployment month of entry into TWA work
Outcomes: Effect (percentage points)
u = 1-12 u = 1 u = 3 u = 6 u = 9 u = 12
Regular Employment 1.7
(−1.5;4.9)
−1.0
(−10.7;8.7)
2.4
(−6.1;10.9)
3.4
(−7.9;14.7)
7.5
(−9.6;24.6)
1.9
(−16.0;19.8)
TWA Employment 25.3
(23.1;27.6)
26.1
(19.5;32.8)
26.6
(20.6;32.5)
24.6
(16.4;32.7)
30.0
(17.8;42.2)
16.3
(5.0;27.7)
Any Employment 26.4
(23.3;29.6)
24.5
(15.3;33.7)
28.4
(20.3;36.5)
27.3
(16.0;38.6)
36.2
(19.6;52.9)
18.0
(−0.0;36.1)
Unemployment 0.2
(−2.5;2.9)
−4.6
(−12.2;3.1)
−6.8
(−13.6;0.0)
3.3
(−6.6;13.1)
−1.7
(−16.6;13.3)
7.4
(−7.9;22.6)
Source: IABES2. 95% confidence intervals are reported in parentheses.
As is evident, the averaged ATTs on the probability of regular employment are never signifi-
cantly different from zero, neither are those for the probability of unemployment, which contradicts
our earlier results contained in Figure 5. The probabilities to be employed in the TWA sector,
or in either TWA or regular work, however, remain strongly and positively affected by program
participation, except for the averaged probability of any social-security employment for workers
who entered in their twelve month of unemployment.
Overall it seems that unemployed workers joining TWA work very early (in the first month) and
very late (in the twelve month) in their unemployment spells tend to fare worse on average than
those workers who join in between these two periods. The former two groups of workers exhibit both
lower treatment effects with respect to TWA employment and our composite employment measure
than do workers treated in other months within their first twelve months of unemployment duration.
In addition, the (albeit not statistically significant) treatment effects on regular employment are
lower and those on unemployment are larger, the latter so at least for the 12th month joiners, for
workers who join TWA work either very early or very late compared to the corresponding treatment
effects of workers who enter TWA work in the third, sixth, and ninth month of unemployment.
For the very early entries into TWA work these differential effects could be explained by workers
having abandoned their search for a regular job out of registered unemployment too quickly, thus
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losing out on potential regular employment opportunities because of reduced job search activity
when being locked in TWA work straight after unemployment registration. The adverse outcomes
observed for very late entries of workers into TWA work might be due to exactly the reverse, i.e.
having waited for too long.
Overall, we may summarize the findings in Table 5 to suggest that unemployed workers benefit
in their overall future employment chances from entering TWA work, because of the increased
likelihood of future TWA employment, but are neither more likely to obtain regular employment,
nor to suffer from increased risks of future unemployment. Sample sizes, however, are fairly small,
and lead to large standard errors in the estimates of our ATTs obtained, as is evident from Table
5. Nevertheless, the estimated treatment effects on regular employment are quite small for entries
into TWA work at the various months of unemployment duration considered in Table 5 compared
to the baseline probabilities of regular employment for the respective matched control groups (see
Table 9 in the appendix).
7 Conclusion
Applying statistical matching techniques, this paper has investigated the average effects of entering
TWA work on the future labor market outcomes of unemployed workers relative to the counter-
factual in which these workers would have continued their job-search in registered unemployment.
The empirical analysis was based on the subsequent labor market trajectories of workers over
a four-year period who registered as unemployed between 1994 and 1996. Unemployed workers
who entered TWA employment within twelve months of unemployment registration turned out
to benefit from both higher monthly employment and TWA employment probabilities throughout
the four year period these workers were followed post treatment. They did not, however, enjoy
greater chances of future regular employment, nor greater risks of unemployment. While our re-
sults, therefore, do not lend empirical support to the stepping-stone hypothesis of TWA work for
unemployed job-seekers in Germany, they do neither confirm the existence of adverse effects on the
future regular employment and unemployment probabilities of workers. If anything, TWA work
seems to provide an access-to-work function for unemployed workers that leaves them with a higher
probability of (TWA) employment for the entire four years their subsequent labor market states
have been analyzed than workers who did not join TWA work as of yet in their unemployment
spell. Personnel-Service-Agencies in Germany, introduced by the latest reform of the LoPA in
2002, were created as bridges for unemployed job-seekers into social security employment by way
of temporary work assignments with client firms. The results of our empirical analysis, however,
call into question the very existence of such a stepping-stone function of temporary agency work for
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the unemployed, and therefore cast doubts on the very premises on which these new instruments
of active labor market policy were introduced.
We have followed TWA workers for a longer time period than existing studies on the stepping-
stone function of TWA work.8 Our results showed that this extended observation period for the
measurement of outcomes proved mandatory in our study to fully capture the pattern of treatment
effects as they evolved over time. Differences in the results obtained in our study to those of
previous analyses, however, are hard to explain. Important differences exist in the sampling design,
evaluation method employed, time periods considered, and regulatory frameworks encountered in
the different countries for which the stepping-stone of TWA employment has been investigated
empirically.
Future research for Germany will have to determine in how far these average treatment effects
on the treated vary across different subpopulations of workers entering TWA work, i.e. explore
potential heterogeneous treatment effects of TWA work, which for lack of sufficient sample sizes
has not been pursued in this study (with the exception of different unemployment months workers
entered into TWA work). Another fruitful area of research would be the consideration of an even
larger set of outcome measures, including non-activity, marginal and self-employment, as well as
indicators of the quality of jobs obtained by former TWA workers, proxied, for instance, by the
type of employment contract held (open-ended or fixed-term). These extensions would require
the use of new longitudinal data of sufficient sample size that record the labor market states of
individuals necessary for constructing measures of these additional outcomes over time. Such data
sources, however, do not yet exist for Germany.
8 Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2004), for instance, measured outcomes only one year and a half post treatment,
and Autor and Houseman (2002) only between 90 days (job retention) and two years (program recidivism) later.
Malo and Muñoz-Bullón (2003) followed TWA workers over a three year period, but as pointed out in Section 3,
based their analysis on an initial stock sample of TWA employees.
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Appendix
Table 6: Summary statistics of the sample at entry into unemployment
Worker Characteristics: Previous real daily gross wage (C=) 47.5
Female 41.5 ∅ real daily gross wage at employer (C=) 54.8
Foreign 9.1 Duration of last job less than 1 year 44.3
Age (years) 34.3 Ever before in TWA work 5.2
Married 49.3 Immediately before in TWA work 1.5
Educational/vocational degree: Unemployment Spell:
secondary 29.5 First time unemployed 49.5
secondary with vocational 66.1 Registered in new German Lander 33.7
polytechnic or university 4.3 Local unemployment rate 11.9
Previous Employment History: Registration in:
Sector: 1994 39.1
Agriculture, forestry, fishery 2.2 1995 31.2
Energy 0.5 1996 29.7
Manufacturing 28.9 1st quarter 33.2
Construction 15.5 2nd quarter 20.1
Trade 13.2 3rd quarter 23.8
Transport 5.0 4th quarter 22.9
Credit 1.2 Entitlements:
Services 22.9 Unemployment benefits 91.6
State 4.7 Unemployment assistance 7.0
Other 5.0 Unemployment support 1.5
Type of last occupation:
In training 9.5
Unskilled blue-collar 25.1
Skilled blue-collar 30.5
White-collar 24.5
Part-time 10.3
Note: Number of workers = 101,475. All entries are in percent, unless stated otherwise.
Source: IABES2.
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Matching Protocol:
Steps 1. - 4. are repeated for the first twelve months u since unemployment registration in 1994
to 1996:
1. All workers treated in month u and all workers still unemployed after u are selected.
2. The conditional probability (propensity score) of joining TWA work in month u is estimated
via a probit regression for the subsample of workers selected in step 1.
3. Based on the propensity score estimated in step 2, the group of treated workers is matched
to the group of non-treated workers in month u by nearest-neighbor without replacement but
within caliper Ψ.
4. The effects on the four monthly outcome measures (∆ujt) of entering TWA work in month u
of unemployment instead of not entering TWA work as yet is calculated as the difference in
the respective outcomes between the treated and the matched controls identified in step 3.
35
Table 7: Estimation of propensity scores by month of entry into TWA work
Months 1 4 8 12
Personal characteristics:
Female -.3080 (-4.52)
∗∗∗
-.2866 (-4.20)
∗∗∗
-.1559 (-1.59) -.2648 (-2.09)
∗
Foreign .0584 (0.71) -.0372 (-0.41) .0411 (0.35) .1393 (1.10)
Age .0069 (0.34) -.0279 (-1.30) .0137 (0.44) .0203 (0.51)
Age
2
-.0002 (-0.85) .0001 (0.42) -.0004 (-0.94) -.0006 (-1.01)
Married -.0306 (-0.53) .0002 (0.00) -.0467 (-0.53) -.0874 (-0.79)
Education:
(ref.: secondary degree)
Vocational degree .2067 (2.64)
∗∗∗
.1528 (1.91)
∗
-.0922 (-0.83) .0551 (0.41)
University -.0941 (-0.46) -.3879 (-1.30) – -.0096 (-0.03)
Last employment spell:
Job tenure less than 1 year .0399 (0.74) .1212 (2.07)
∗∗
.2865 (3.33)
∗∗∗
.0424 (0.41)
Occupation:
(ref.: unskilled blue collar)
Training .1820 (1.70)
∗
.4933 (4.91)
∗∗∗
.1530 (0.94) .0758 (0.40)
Skilled blue collar -.0110 (.07) .0109 (.07) .1939 (1.66)
∗
.1219 (0.87)
White collar -.0003 (-0.00) .0283 (0.30) .0465 (0.33) -.1246 (-0.69)
Part time .0641 (0.52) -.1355 (-0.90) -.1149 (-0.58) -.0213 (-0.10)
Real gross daily income
Of worker -.0004 (-0.35) .0006 (0.89) .0004 (0.46) -.0004 (-0.19)
Average at employer .0002 (0.13) .0011 (0.73) .0021 (0.89) .0030 (1.07)
Sector:
(ref.: manufacturing)
Agriculture -.1250 (-0.65) .1760 (1.04) – –
Energy .1943 (0.76) .1908 (0.69) – –
Construction -.0721 (-0.99) .0065 (0.08) .1124 (0.97) .1314 (0.96)
Trade -.0858 (-1.00) -.0759 (-0.81) -.0922 (-0.61) .0539 (0.34)
Transport -.1371 (-1.11) -.1582 (-1.18) .0387 (0.22) -.3736 (-1.10)
Credit -.0165 (-0.07) .0864 (0.39) .1171 (0.34) –
Services -.1495 (-1.84)
∗
-.1196 (-1.37) .0394 (0.32) .0239 (0.16)
State -.6620 (-2.42)
∗∗
-.0928 (-0.67) -.0596 (-0.30) -.1375 (-0.53)
Other -.1766 (-1.19) -.2456 (-1.42) -.1566 (-0.66) -.0593 (-0.23)
Previous TWA work:
At some point in past .5388 (6.75)
∗∗∗
.6027 (7.13)
∗∗∗
.3993 (3.30)
∗∗∗
.3818 (2.62)
∗∗∗
Last job was in TWA sector .5735 (4.80)
∗∗∗
.7099 (5.80)
∗∗∗
.5312 (3.00)
∗∗∗
.2499 (1.05)
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... continued.
Months 1 4 8 12
Unemployment characteristics:
First-time unemployed .0726 (1.30) -.0253 (-0.41) -.0409 (-0.46) .1210 (1.18)
Registered in new Lander .1096 (1.26) .1473 (1.66)
∗
.0669 (0.49) -.3347 (-1.90)
∗
Local unemployment rate .0021 (0.21) .0084 (0.80) -.0130 (-0.84) .0138 (0.77)
Entitlements (ref.: benefits):
Support payments – -.0818 (-0.92) -.1114 (-1.07) .2273 (2.05)
∗∗
Living supports -.1195 (-1.24) -.7223 (-3.05)
∗∗∗
-.3595 (-2.19)
∗∗
-.1177 (-0.72)
Registration:
(ref.: 1994, 1st quarter)
1995 .0790 (1.34) -.1378 (-2.18)
∗∗
-.0387 (-0.44) -.2215 (-1.71)
∗
1996 .0942 (1.57) -.0709 (-1.17) -.1082 (-1.14) .1279 (1.23)
2nd quarter .2622 (3.89)
∗∗∗
-.0618 (-0.97) -.1167 (-0.97) .3672 (2.61)
∗∗∗
3rd quarter .2435 (3.65)
∗∗∗
-.2780 (-3.88)
∗∗∗
.0127 (0.12) .3744 (2.72)
∗∗∗
4th quarter .1093 (1.52) -.3915 (-5.04)
∗∗∗
.1730 (1.78)
∗
.1888 (1.22)
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. z-statistics in parantheses.
Source: IABES2.
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Table 8: Average effects on the probabilities of being in different labor market states for various
outcome months
Outcomes: Effect (percentage points):
t = 3 t = 6 t = 12 t = 24 t = 36 t = 48
Regular Employment −1.8
(−4.2;0.6)
−1.3
(−4.1;1.6)
2.2
(−0.9;5.3)
4.2
(1.0;7.4)
1.2
(−2.0;4.5)
1.4
(−1.8;4.7)
TWA Employment 64.2
(61.9;66.5)
44.5
(42.1;47.0)
30.6
(28.3;33.0)
18.9
(16.8;21.0)
15.2
(13.2;17.1)
13.5
(11.6;15.3)
Any Employment 60.5
(57.9;63.1)
42.0
(39.1;45.0)
32.1
(29.0;35.2)
22.7
(19.5;25.9)
15.8
(12.7;19.0)
14.4
(11.2;17.6)
Unemployment −15.6
(−18.3;−12.9)
0.9
(−1.9;3.6)
3.7
(1.0;6.4)
3.6
(0.9;6.3)
0.8
(−1.8;3.5)
−0.6
(−3.2;2.0)
Note: 95% confidence intervals are reported in parantheses.
Source: IABES2.
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Table 9: Estimated probabilities for different outcomes and control groups by elapsed unemploy-
ment duration
Outcomes: Average probability (percent):
u = 1-12 u = 1 u = 3 u = 6 u = 9 u = 12
Regular Employment 37.7
(35.5;40.0)
45.5
(38.7;52.4)
41.3
(35.3;47.3)
34.8
(26.8;42.7)
32.1
(20.3;43.9)
38.3
(25.7;50.9)
TWA Employment 3.2
(2.4;4.0)
3.1
(0.7;5.5)
3.1
(1.0;5.2)
4.0
(0.7;7.2)
1.7
(−1.6;4.9)
3.5
(−1.3;8.2)
Any Employment 40.9
(38.6;43.1)
48.5
(41.6;55.4)
44.4
(38.4;50.5)
38.6
(30.5;46.7)
33.7
(21.8;45.7)
41.6
(28.8;54.4)
Unemployment 21.9
(20.0;23.8)
21.4
(15.8;27.1)
23.2
(18.0;28.3)
21.1
(14.3;27.9)
23.5
(12.7;34.2)
18.7
(8.6;28.8)
Note: 95% confidence intervals are reported in parantheses. Individual columns do not have to add up to 1.
Source: IABES2.
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